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ABSTRACT 
Increasing globalisation of economic activity and accompanying economic growth 
have been factors in the worldwide loss of natural environments and biodiversity loss, 
and these losses have accelerated since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, 
Emissions of many types of pollutants and wastes from human activity are rising 
globally and are exceeding the capacity of natural environments to absorb and 
neutralize them. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the quality and size of 
some natural sinks for neutralizing them (such as forests) are declining. Consequently, 
these wastes are accumulating in many environments and pose a growing threat to 
human welfare and to sustainable economic development. There are, for instance, 
global concerns about greenhouse gas emissions, about the release of ozone-depleting 
substances and about the worldwide loss of existing biodiversity. Many new 
transboundary and local environmental issues have also emerged as a result of global 
economic growth. After considering such matters, arguments for global governance 
and the international harmonization of rules for regulating environmental use are 
examined. Reasons why the global spread of the Western evolved economic system 
reduces moral responsibility for environmental damage and increases the need for 
greater and more effective global and international environmental governance are 
outlined. Subsequently, several important global and international environmental 
problems are identified and shortcomings in their governance are highlighted. Further 
analysis is then completed to discover reasons why as economic globalisation 
increases, there are continuing failures in market and political systems to provide 
adequate governance of global and international environmental problems. 
 
Keywords: environmental economics, environmental governance, environmental law, 
environmental regulation, globalisation, global warming, greenhouse gases, 
transboundary pollution, transboundary natural resources. 
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1. Introduction 
All regions of the world have now become more closely interconnected in their 
economic operations as a result of growing market-oriented globalisation, a process 
described, for example, by Tisdell and Sen (2004, Ch.1) and Tisdell (2005) . In 
addition, global and international environmental problems have grown in importance 
and it is recognised that these need to be better addressed by extensions in governance, 
including more effective global governance. These aspects are not entirely unrelated 
because it is widely believed (for instance, by bodies such as the World Trade 
Organization, WTO) that greater economic globalisation stimulates economic growth, 
an outcome which the WTO favours. On the other hand, many neo-Malthusians argue 
that global economic growth of the type that has occurred since the Industrial 
Revolution is unsustainable because of its depletion of the stocks of natural resources 
and because of its continuing adverse impacts on natural environments, and, in some 
cases, also its negative effects on man-made environments and anthropogenic 
resource stocks, such as the diversity of cultivated crops and domesticated livestock. 
The spectre has emerged (according to neo-Malthusians) of reduced economic 
scarcity (greater wealth) now as a result of economic growth at the expense of much 
greater economic scarcity in the future. The necessary conditions for sustainable 
economic growth are subject to debate and official reports such as the Brundtland 
Report (WCED, 1987) may have been overly optimistic about the prospects of 
achieving sustainable development. There appears to be strong political and 
institutional pressure for high rates of economic growth even though these may 
eventually add to economic scarcity, that is to a lack of sustainable development. The 
strong institutional constraints that are hampering efforts to achieve sustainable 
development are outlined in Tisdell (1999, Ch. 6). 
Because some environmental problems (such as global warming and biodiversity loss) 
have become matters of global concern and because several of these problems need to 
be addressed by improved global governance, the focus of this article is on 
environmental governance and how it affects economic performance. Initially, reasons 
1 
are given about why the spread of the market system and increased globalisation are 
likely to add to important environmental problems and some of these major 
environmental problems are identified and discussed. After considering general 
failures in environmental governance, limitations of Western market systems as 
means for providing guidance on environmental use are outlined and then political 
inadequacies that contribute to lack of environmental deterioration are identified. No 
easy solution to these problems appears to be in sight. 
2. Consequences of the Global Economic System and Increased Globalisation 
for the State of the Environment. 
2.1 The tendency of modern economic systems to reduce the felt moral responsibility 
of individuals for environmental damage caused by their economic activity 
There is a strong tendency for the spread of Western-evolved economic systems based 
on a combination of market mechanisms and hierarchical procedures to reduce the 
moral responsibility individuals feel for the environmental damages caused by their 
economic choices. This occurs for a variety of reasons, many of which have been 
outlined in Tisdell (1990, Ch. 2). 
Most economists have praised the ability of market systems to co-ordinate economic 
activities in relatively complex modern economies which involve a high degree of 
interdependence and often remote interconnections between different activities. It is 
argued that such systems are relatively efficient and perform well if they incorporate a 
sufficient amount of market competition. Originally it was believed that such systems 
would be most advantageous if they were perfectly competitive but later economists 
such as John Maurice Clark (1940) argued that workably competitive markets might 
show superior economic performance in practice to perfectly competitive markets; a 
view compatible with that developed by Schumpeter (1954). Whereas the former 
group of economists (neoclassical scholars) tended to emphasize allocative efficiency, 
the latter group stressed the dynamic economic (growth) performance of economic 
systems. 
Despite these differences, a general consensus has emerged amongst economists that 
market systems have desirable economic consequences because they minimize the 
amount of information and costs of decision-making needed to ensure their relatively 
2 
efficient operations of economies compared to economic systems that are highly 
centralized. As emphasized by members of the Austrian School of Economics (for 
example, Hayek, 1948), each economic actor in a market system need only have 
knowledge of a limited number of economic parameters in order to make ‘optimal’ 
economic choices. For example, a consumer in purchasing a commodity from a 
supermarket need only know its relative price and need not know by whom its 
ingredients were supplied, how they were supplied and from where they came. While 
this is an appealing consequence of modern market systems, it also has some 
drawbacks.  
In such a system, buyers are likely to be completely or partially unaware of many of 
the negative social or environmental consequences of their purchases. This lack of 
knowledge results in lack of felt moral responsibility by buyers. Secondly, because 
buyers are not directly responsible for decisions made in most of the links in the 
product chain, they may feel that they are free of moral responsibility for any negative 
social or environmental consequences of decisions involving earlier links in this chain. 
Because economic globalisation extends the geographical sourcing of products and 
tends to increase the remoteness of their sourcing (or that of their components) from 
buyers, this can add further to a reduction in the felt moral responsibility for the social 
and environmental consequence of their choices (See for example, Aurifeille et al., 
2009). For example, how strongly do European buyers of margarine feel about the 
environmental consequences of their purchases of margarine (or biodiesel) derived 
from palm oil? Such purchases are indirectly resulting in the loss of rainforests in 
Indonesia and Malaysia with significant biodiversity loss, They are threatening the 
survival of species such as the orangutan, and may actually be adding to greenhouse 
gas accumulation in the atmosphere (Swarna Nantha and Tisdell, 2009). 
Modern economic systems are, of course, not entirely market-based, but to varying 
degrees contain hierarchical components. This applies, in particular, to larger sized 
businesses, many of which are corporations, and an increasing number of these 
businesses are engaged in multinational activities. In such bodies, important decisions 
are often made by committees. This diminishes individual responsibility for decisions 
that have adverse social consequences, or which cause significant environmental 
deterioration. Secondly, when a company is engaged in international economic 
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activity, its central managers may feel little social responsibility for adverse 
consequences of the company’s activities in remote locations. This may be partly 
because they only have limited knowledge about these consequences because of the 
regional delegation of management, and the old adage ‘out of sight, out of mind’ 
could apply. 
Economic competition is another factor likely to result in failure of businesses to 
mitigate environmental spillovers from their activities unless governments intervene 
by adopting policies which make it more profitable for businesses to take account of 
these spillovers rather than neglect them. Even if businessmen do feel social 
responsibility for their adverse environmental spillovers, market capitalism may 
prevent them from making allowance for these. In many circumstances, the survival 
of firms depends on their ability to maximize profit or to come with striking distance 
of doing so. This can be a consequence of intense competition in product (or more 
generally commodity) markets or in capital (financial) markets. The former possibility 
is well recognized but the latter possibility is less well known. Marris (1964) argued 
that under corporate capitalism, public companies are limited in their ability to deviate 
from profit maximization and survive under their existing management because those 
that fail to maximize profit risk being taken over by financial raiders. Therefore, 
strong competitive pressures exist in modern market systems which deter businesses 
from taking into account the adverse environmental externalities which they generate. 
Consequently, as this system spreads globally, these negative consequences become 
more prevalent.  
In the absence of government regulation of activities causing negative externalities, 
business may feel no compulsion to limit these externalities or they be unable to do so 
because of competitive pressures. They may adopt the view that it is incumbent on 
governments to adopt policies and laws to regulate negative environmental spillovers. 
In the absence of the requisite laws, business may believe that they are justified in 
generating adverse externalities because they do not break the law. Hence, their 
behaviour is increasingly governed by the law, rather than by their social conscience. 
However, as is well known, laws are not always enforced and corruption occurs in 
most countries with different degrees of prevalence. If corruption is a part of a local 
culture, businesses operating in these localities may find that the only way that they 
4 
can succeed is by adopting local practices and they may not consider it ethically 
wrong to act corruptly in these circumstances. Therefore, the law becomes ineffective 
in regulating adverse externalities in such cases. 
Is it likely that shareholders will deter public companies from engaging in negative 
environmental behaviour if this behaviour adds to the profitability of companies? 
There are several reasons for believing that this is unlikely. First, given the separation 
of management and ownership of public corporations, shareholders have little direct 
influence on the decisions of company managers. Secondly, the number of ethical 
investors in publicly listed companies is probably small so their influence is limited. 
Thirdly, investors who have ethical concerns may argue that other investors will be 
guided in investing by the returns on their investment rather than ethical 
considerations and therefore, whether or not they purchase shares in a particular 
company, will hardly influence the behaviour of its managers. Fourthly, since each 
shareholder is usually one of many investors in a public company and each has no 
direct influence on managerial decisions within it, all shareholders may feel justified 
in absolving themselves of any moral responsibility for the company’s actions. The 
fact also that a company is an independent legal activity may further weaken the sense 
of moral responsibility felt by its individual investors for its actions. Therefore, the 
global proliferation of public companies and the global spread of their activities 
(which is facilitated by the process of economic globalisation) increase the 
dependence of societies on good legal governance to ensure acceptable social 
outcomes from economic activities. Table 1 provides a summary of the type of 
influences in modern market systems that weaken felt moral responsibility of 
economic actors for the negative social and environmental consequences of their 
economic actions. These factors need to be addressed by extending and improving 
legal governance. Growing economic globalisation adds to the need for this. 
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Table 1: Some factors (increased in significance by globalisation) contributing 
in modern market economies to a reduction of felt moral 
responsibility of individuals for the adverse social and environmental 
consequences of their economic actions. These need to be addressed 
by greater and more effective legal governance. 
 Contributing Factor and Comment 
1. Buyers of commodities have become more ignorant of the remoter 
social and environmental consequences of their decisions as supply 
chains have lengthened and become geographically more dispersed with 
greater globalisation. This greater ignorance reduces felt moral 
responsibility of buyers for their choices and remoteness of 
consequences may reinforce this. 
2. On the supply-side, business decisions are increasingly made by 
committees because the size of many businesses have increased. 
Individual members of committees may not feel personally responsible 
for decisions by committees. This can weaken the exercise of ethical 
responsibility. 
3. Informational constraints in larger businesses (e.g. multinationals) 
operating in dispersed areas may reduces the knowledge of top 
management of adverse social and environmental consequences of the 
actions of the business in remote locations. This can result in failure by 
the business to address such issues. 
4. Economic competition (in the absence of relevant government 
regulation) weakens the ability of businesses to allow for the adverse 
social and environmental consequences of their actions. This can 
occur as a result of market competition in commodity markets and 
particularly in the case of public companies, competition in financial 
markets is relevant. These factors limit the scope which businesses have 
from deviating from profit-maximizing behaviour. 
5. Shareholders (investors) in public companies place little weight on 
the social and environmental consequences of the behaviour of these 
companies unless these behaviours reduce the returns on their 
investment. Investors are attracted to invest in companies that maximize 
the returns on their investment for reasons outlined in the text. 
Furthermore, because of the separation of ownership and management in 
public companies, investors feel little personal ethical concern about the 
negative social and environmental consequences of public companies in 
which they invested. 
6. Increased geographical nobility of individuals and resources reduces 
incentives to conserve local natural resources and environments for 
reasons explained in the text. 
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In addition, it ought to be noted that increased geographical mobility of individuals 
and the geographical widening of their investment possibilities can result in 
individuals being less concerned about sustaining environments and natural resources 
in their locality. This is because they have the opportunity of shifting themselves or 
changing their investment to another locality if their local environment deteriorates or 
natural resources become scarcer in their locality. However, if everyone everywhere 
acts on this premise, all environments are likely to deteriorate. One of the features of 
increased economic globalisation is that it permits greater international mobility of 
resources, although liberalization of international labour movements still remains 
restricted.  
2.2 Can economic globalisation by stimulating economic growth actually lead to 
environmental improvement in the absence of greater government regulation of 
economic activity?  
It has been argued that if sufficient economic growth occurs, it can actually be 
environmentally beneficial because when incomes are higher, individuals are more 
concerned about pollution and environmental pollution and it has been observed that 
the level of emissions of many pollutants continually declines in relation to the level 
of gross output. For example, CO2 emissions in relation to GDP appear to increase as 
first with economic growth but once a sufficiently high level of GDP is achieved, they 
decline. The relationship is of a reversed-U shape and the curve involved has been 
christened the environmental Kuznets curve.  
It is widely believed that increasing economic globalisation stimulates economic 
growth and that given the above mentioned considerations, it will contribute 
eventually to environmental improvement. However, there is little evidence that 
continuing economic growth is likely to be sufficient to mitigate many of the 
important environmental problems associated with economic growth. Tisdell (2001) 
gives a number of reasons why this is so. For example, even if the intensity of 
pollution emissions decline as gross production increases, the aggregate level of 
pollution emissions can continue to rise. Furthermore, if the aggregate level emissions 
start to decline, the flow of these emissions can continue to exceed the capacity of the 
environment to absorb or neutralize these (Tisdell, 2009a, Ch. 7). In the case of 
greenhouse gases, for example, they can still continue to accumulate in the 
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atmosphere and consequently, even deeper emissions cuts will be required in the 
future to lower the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere.  
In addition, some environmental damages caused in periods of economic growth are 
irreversible, for example, biodiversity loss.  
Therefore, the environmental damages caused by higher economic growth (as a result 
of greater economic globalisation) seem to call for greater environmental regulation 
rather than less. Some advocates of the environmental Kuznets curve use it as an 
argument for reduced environmental regulation. This increased governance is also 
likely to require greater cooperation between nations in regulating environmental use 
in their individual countries. This is particularly evident in relation to measures to 
limit the emissions of greenhouse gases.  
3. Important Global and Transboundary Environmental Problems Identified 
Many global and transboundary problems are emerging and increasing in intensity 
This section outlines several of these problems but their governance is not analyzed at 
this stage but is considered later. The most prominent of these problems at present is 
global warming caused primarily by greenhouse gas emissions from economic 
activity and the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere. According to scientific 
evidence, this is a major contributor to climate change and is expected to result (or is 
already resulting in) rising temperatures and sea-levels. Consequently, natural 
environments in all parts of the world are predicted to alter (mostly in a negative way 
from a human perspective) as a result of this phenomenon. Furthermore, greenhouse 
gas emissions in every part of the world contribute to this problem. Therefore, in 
order to control the problem, cooperation and coordination of all (or at most) nations 
are needed to collectively limit their greenhouse gas emissions. 
The basic problem was recognized in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCC) which came into force in 1992. However, progress in 
controlling the accumulation of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere has been slow. 
Attempts to do this through the Kyoto Protocol have proven to be largely ineffective. 
There were several reasons for this:  
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(1) Some major emitters of greenhouse gases (such as the USA and 
developing countries, such as China and India) were not parties to the 
Protocol. 
(2) The emission targets of many of the parties to the Protocol were not met.  
(3) As discussed later, there was only partial accounting of the greenhouse gas 
imprint of most countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol. Whether or 
not a more effective form of global governance of greenhouse gas 
accumulations will be agreed to at Copenhagen when national 
representatives discuss a replacement for the Kyoto Protocol, and whether 
it will subsequently be implemented fully, remains to be seen. 
Another matter of concern because its effects are geographically widespread has been 
the release of ozone depleting substances. These cause a reduction in the ozone layer 
in the atmosphere. This layer reduces ultraviolet radiation in southern and northern 
portions of the globe. A reduction in this layer has several adverse environmental 
effects. These include an increase in skin cancer, reductions in plant growth and 
accelerated deterioration of paints. As a result of the Montreal Protocol, there has 
been a reduction in the emission of several ozone-depleting substances but not all 
(Tisdell, 2009a, Ch. 11). 
There are also other environmental problems that call for cooperative international 
agreement and governance. These include:  
(1) International transmission of acid rains 
 For example, gases implicated in the occurrence of acid rains drift from China 
to Korea and Japan, from the UK to Scandinavian countries, and from the 
United States to Canada. 
(2) International smoke haze and drift of particulate matter. 
 Forest fires in Indonesia (often deliberately lit) periodically result in smoke haze 
in other parts of Southeast Asia, for example, Singapore. 
(3) Depletion of shared water resources. 
 In many parts of the world, water resources are shared by several nations. The 
Nile Basin for example involves many countries, as does the Mekong River 
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Basin. Greater off-take of water upstream can reduce the amount of water 
available to nations downstream and have adverse environmental consequences. 
When the international shared water resources drain into an inland basin (such 
as that occupied by the Aral Sea in Central Asia), reduced discharge of water 
into it can have serious ecological consequences. 
(4) Pollution of internationally shared water resources 
 When several nations share a water body, the individual nations involved may 
fail to take account of the adverse impacts on other nations of their release of 
water pollutants into the shared water body. 
(5) Inefficient utilization or conservation of shared and internationally mobile 
biological resources, for example, fish. 
 Many wild species travel across national borders (often as a part of their life-
cycles) and therefore, are effectively shared resources. If the harvesting or 
conservation of these is not effectively co-ordinated, the collective outcome can 
be socially sub-optimal. For example, unrestrained harvest of a fish species 
early in its life-cycle (or in the early part of its migratory path) by the nation in 
which it initially appears usually reduces the catch available to other nations 
through which the migrating species subsequently passes and lowers the 
maximum sustainable economic catch of the species. International fishing 
agreements (such as those relating to different types of tuna stocks) attempt to 
address this issue. However, such agreements are frequently imperfect in their 
operation. 
(7) Unsatisfactory utilization of marine resources present outside of territorial 
waters. 
 In the absence of international agreements covering the use of particular natural 
resources occurring outside of territorial waters, these are open-access resources. 
Although the United Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNICLOS) extended the exclusive economic marine zone of nations, some 
ocean areas are still not territorial waters. This creates particular environmental 
problems for the optimal use of their resources. These resources are open-access 
resources and therefore, subject to excessive economic exploitation. Note also 
the UNICLOS did not solve the mobile marine resource problem mentioned in 
point (6) above. 
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(8) International biodiversity loss 
 Two international conventions are in force that attempt to control global 
biodiversity loss. These are the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) and the more recent Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). The former bans or restricts international trade in species 
which are declared to be endangered. The latter, amongst other things, attempts 
to strengthen national property rights in genetic resources that exist within a 
country’s borders.  These conventions aim to overcome biodiversity loss by 
adopting different economic approaches, neither of which is completely 
effective (see for example, Tisdell, 2009b). 
(9) Dangers posed by the International transfer and escape of genetically 
modified organisms 
 Several international environmental problems can arise from the release of 
genetically modified organisms. The Cartagena Protocol is intended to address 
several of these problems. It focuses, however, only on the international transfer 
of genetically modified organisms by deliberate human actions and does not 
address all the international issues involved in the release of engineered 
organisms, for example, the accidental movement of such organisms 
internationally. 
These are only a sample of global and international environmental issues calling for 
effective governance. The extent and the importance of these issues have magnified 
with continuing economic growth and the accompanying extension of the process of 
economic globalisation. 
4. Failures in the Governance of Global and International Environmental 
Problems 
4.1 Inadequacies of environmental governance by market systems. 
Market systems provide one means of governance of resource use. But often markets 
are missing (as in the case of pure public goods) or incomplete, as in the case of 
economic activity that gives rise to environmental spillovers. In such cases, market 
systems have shortcomings that in some cases can be rectified, or partially rectified, 
by government intervention in their operation. For example, pollution taxes or charges, 
11 
or systems involving tradable permits for pollution emissions (cap-and-trade systems) 
may be introduced by governments to address the environmental shortcomings of 
market systems. 
However, if the government of a country decides to regulate an environmental 
externality that adversely affects its citizens as well as those of nearby countries, it has 
little or no economic incentive to do this in a manner that would be economically 
optimal from a collective international point of view. The country can be expected to 
ignore its negative environmental impacts on other nations unless the other countries 
adversely affected by such externalities compensate it for the economic benefit it 
forgoes as a result of its greater environmental regulation. 
Figure 1 illustrates this case. Economic production in Country I is assumed to 
generate X amount of pollution emissions. The marginal benefits to producers in 
Country I of being able to emit these pollutants is shown by the line AD. However, 
the citizens of Country I suffer marginal external damages as a result of these 
emissions as depicted by line OF. In addition, there is also an external environmental 
spillover on a second country, Country II, and the marginal external costs to Country 
II of this spillover is equivalent to the difference between line OF and OE. Therefore, 
the marginal aggregate (global) damages from pollution in Country I are as shown by 
the line OE. Reciprocal externalities (between these countries) are supposed to be 
absent. 
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Figure 1: An illustration of a case in which a country has no economic incentive 
to regulate its pollution emissions in a way which takes into account 
these negative impacts on other countries. 
In the absences of intervention by the government of Country I, producers in that 
country will emit X3 of pollutants per period assuming that a market system exists and 
that producers are profit-maximizers. This is not collectively ideal from an economics 
point of view because a potential Paretian improvement can be achieved in Country I 
by reducing the quantity of pollution emissions from X3 to X2 and its government may 
adopt regulations which bring this about. However, this action is not yet collectively 
ideal from an international point of view. Although it increases economic welfare in 
Country II, there is scope to further increases the collective economic welfare of the 
two nations involved. 
A further reduction in the level of pollution emissions by Country I from X2 to X1 per 
period can raise the aggregate economic benefits of the concerned countries by an 
amount equivalent to the area of triangle BCE. However, Country I has no economic 
incentive to take this action unless it is compensated for its reduced economic benefits 
(extra economic costs) by Country II. The extra economic cost to Country I of this 
action is the loss of economic benefits equivalent to the area of triangle BGC and the 
gains to Country II are equivalent to the area of the quadrilateral BGCE. Hence, a net 
collective economic gain of an amount equivalent to the area of triangle BCE can be 
achieved but Country I has no incentive to bring this about unless Country II 
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compensates it in some way for the economic benefit it forgoes. Potentially, both 
countries can gain because there is scope for Country II to more than compensate 
Country I for its extra cost of environmental regulation and still be better off than 
beforehand. In other words, scope exists for a global potential Paretian improvement. 
Nonetheless, the above possibility does not ensure that an optimal solution for the 
governance of international environmental spillovers will be found. Bargaining 
problems and political considerations, as well as strong feelings about how just a 
possible solution is, can stand in the way of the resolution of such problems. 
Consequently, as economic growth and globalisation proceeds such issues can be 
expected to become more serious. This is because growing market failure is 
compounded by international political failures. Furthermore, the type of institutional 
failures (identified in Section 2.1) add to these environmental problems as market 
structures of the existing Western type become more widespread. 
4.2 Political inadequacies in the governance of global environmental problems 
Global environmental governance is quite weak and has developed at a far slower 
pace than the rate of magnification of global environmental problems due to growing 
economic globalisation and continuing long-term economic growth. Here it is only 
possible to provide some short sketches of factors that result in political inadequacies 
in the governance of global environmental problems. Achieving awareness is the first 
step in searching for solutions to these shortcomings. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that solutions can always be found. 
Even when a potential Paretian improvement (that is, a solution that can potentially 
make all parties better off) from improved international governance is possible, the 
following political impediments can stand in the way of such a solution: 
(1) Reactive political behaviour. Very often political action is not taken until 
serious environmental problems become obvious. Because of such delays 
(slow reactive behaviours) serious irreversible environmental damage may 
occur. Inadequate precaution may be taken (see Tisdell, forthcoming). 
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(2) Bargaining problems. Even in cases where environmental regulation is 
advantageous to all countries (or a large number), bargaining about how the 
international costs of such regulation should be shared by nations can result 
in lack of agreement or suboptimal governance. In other words, distributional 
disputes restrict possibilities for international environmental governance. 
This is currently a problem in relation to the containment of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
(3) A prisoners’ dilemma problem may occur. All nations may have a 
collective desire to impose environmental restrictions, but each nation 
individually has an incentive not to enforce these restrictions. As a result, all 
nations suffer. For example, Annex I (developed) nations who were parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol failed to meet their commitments to reduce their 
greenhouse emissions to agreed levels, and their collective goal was not 
achieved. 
(4) Lack of global enforcement mechanisms. In the absence of adequate 
sanctions on countries that fail to observe their international agreements, 
there is a high risk that some nations will not honour their international 
obligations. This is a particularly serious matter when an international 
environmental problem is akin to a prisoners’ dilemma.  
(5) Monitoring limitations. The enforcement problem is exacerbated by 
difficulties that can arise in trying to monitor national compliance with 
international environmental agreements. Most countries guard their 
sovereignty and may deny foreigners access for monitoring their 
environmental activities. 
(6) Imprecise specification of environmental objectives. Frequently, the 
purpose or objective stated in international environmental agreements is 
imprecise. This allows flexibility in their interpretation. This can be 
advantageous but on the other hand, it can provide an avenue for avoiding 
responsibilities and lead to confusion. The precautionary principle, as stated 
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in several international environmental agreements, suffers from this problem 
(see Tisdell, forthcoming). 
(7) Partial solutions to global environmental problems. The Kyoto Protocol, 
for example focused mainly on greenhouse gas emissions generated within 
Annex I countries while at the same time ignoring additions to greenhouse 
gas emissions caused elsewhere by these countries. Greater greenhouse gas 
emissions in less developed countries supplying imports to more developed 
countries were ignored for the most part. For instance, Europe increased its 
use of biofuel, some of which was manufactured from palm oil exported 
from Southeast Asia. The expansion of palm oil production in Southeast Asia 
has added to tropical deforestation there and reduced carbon sequestration by 
these forests thereby contributing to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere and biodiversity loss (see for example, Hunt, 2009). 
Furthermore, while the import of greenhouse-intensive products from China 
and India by developed countries (rather than their production in developed 
nations) reduces the greenhouse gas emissions emanating from developed 
nations, it does not reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, 
developed countries importing these products should be held morally 
responsible for the associated greenhouse gas emissions in developing 
countries. 
(8) The need to pander to the wishes of special interest groups. In most 
countries, special interest economic groups are powerful lobbyists and may 
undermine potential international environmental agreements which would be 
in the collective global interest. For example, many large companies in 
Australia have lobbied successfully for special consideration (for instance, 
aluminium producers) in relation to the Australian Governments proposed 
cap-and-trade reforms to regulate greenhouse gas emissions on the basis that 
they will be forced to move their activities offshore (in the absence of such 
concessions) to nations that have no controls or less restrictive controls on 
those emissions, for example, China or India.  
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It could be argued that the situation described under point (7) above is a case of 
incomplete global environmental (or green) accounting because it fails to take into 
account foreign emissions of greenhouse gases which can be attributed to the 
economic decisions of another country or region. For example, suppose that the EU 
has restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions but these regulations are either absent in 
Asia, or minimal. As a result, the production of greenhouse gas-intensive products can 
be expected to alter their geographic location from the EU to Asia. The EU may well 
import many of these products from Asia rather than produce them itself. There is 
geographical displacement of the EU’s emission of greenhouse gases to Asia. 
However, the emissions which the EU indirectly generates in Asia are not attributed 
to the EU. Similarly, if the EU imports palm oil from Southeast Asia and this is 
produced by clearing forests in Southeast Asia, its negative environmental effect (for 
example, by raising greenhouse gas accumulation) is not attributed to the EU, even 
thought demand from the EU is the driving force in such forest clearing. Figure 2 
provides a sketch of this phenomenon. 
EU 
Restricts GHG 
emissions within the EU 
and only counts these 
emissions as being 
attributable to its 
economic behaviour. 
ASIA 
Does not restrict GHG emissions. 
EU increases its demand for GHG-
intensive goods produced in Asia, 
and increases its imports of these. 
The EU imports products from Asia 
that reduce its GHG emissions in 
the EU but increases those in Asia, 
For example, use of palm oil by the 
EU results in deforestation in Asia. 
INTER- 
DEPENDENT 
 
Figure 2: An illustration of flaws in the partial approach to regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. In this case, reduced 
GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions in the EU result in an increase in 
GHG emissions in Asia due to economic choices by those in the EU. 
Therefore, the EU’s restrictions on GHG emissions are, to a 
considerable extent, globally ineffective. Should the EU be held 
morally responsible for the extra GHG emissions that its economic 
choices cause in Asia? 
Another possible political problem in developing effective global governance is that 
the period in office of elected politicians is relatively short and even those politicians 
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who are not elected have a limited life-span. This may persuade them to concentrate 
on short-term visible (material) progress to help ensure their re-election or to leave 
behind a concrete legacy in their lifetime. From this angle, the adoption of long-term 
programmes to prevent environmental determination is unlikely to have a high 
priority for them. Politicians tend to adopt short-term horizons in their decision-
making.  
5. Concluding Comments 
It has been argued that economic globalisation by spreading the economic market 
system (of the type which has evolved in the West) tends to reduce the felt moral 
responsibility of individuals for the adverse environmental and social consequences 
(some of which are remote) of their economic actions. Furthermore, it stimulates 
economic growth which occurs in a manner that adds to environmental deterioration 
in important ways. While some environmental conditions can improve as a result of 
economic growth, others deteriorate and can eventually threaten the sustainability of 
economic activity, for example, greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere. The 
weakening of felt moral responsibility is mainly a consequence of the institutional 
structure of market systems that have evolved in the West. Furthermore, the desire of 
individuals for economic growth remains strong because of personal desires for 
greater income and wealth accumulation. In addition to this desire, the structure of 
modern economies is such that they must continue to grow in order to maintain full 
employment (Tisdell, 1999, Ch. 6). The immediate economic welfare of all is locked 
into an economic system that needs to continually grow in order to satisfy most 
citizens. The system continues on its growth path even though the long-term 
environmental consequences of this could be disastrous. 
The above factors magnify in significance as economic globalisation proceeds and 
hence, the need for improved environmental governance of Western-evolved market 
systems and the nature of economic growth grows. However, because governance is 
primarily the responsibility, in the modern era, of individual nations, global 
governance is failing to develop in a manner needed to address these issues 
adequately. It is not yet clear how the global community can overcome this impasse. 
In this regard, the governing structure provided by the United Nations has been 
helpful but since its membership is based on national representation, it is still far from 
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effective in providing mechanisms for desirable forms of global and international 
governance.  
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